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The Valour and the Horror 
Controversy and the Official 
History of the RCAF, Volume 3 
David Bercuson and Syd Wise 
T he publication ofVolume 3 of the Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force 
by Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, 
William C. Johnston and William G.P. Rawling, 
(University of Toronto Press, 1994) 
reawakened the media controversy over The 
Valour and the Horror, particularly that related 
to the "Death by Moonlight" episode. Although 
there are certain similarities in approach 
between the Official History and the film, 
some of them superficial and some of them 
not, the differences are far more significant 
than the similarities. Volume 3 is in fact a 
comprehensive and well-documented history 
of the RCAF's overseas operations in the 
Second World War; the RCAF's role in the 
bombing offensive occupies 344 of 909 pages 
of text. Though much of this section is taken 
up with the origins and history ofNo.6 (RCAF) 
Group, the authors also examine the origins 
of the RAF's bombing philosophy in the 1919-
1939 period, and trace the evolution and 
execution of RAF bombing policy during the 
war. 
The merits of this volume of the RCAF 
history were not what caught the attention of 
the media (which, by contrast, had all but 
ignored the first two volumes of the history). 
Rather, it was because the authors appeared 
to be arguing that Sir Arthur Harris' accession 
to the leadership of Bomber Command in 
1942 that brought a decided shift to "area" 
bombing aimed at destroying German morale 
by killing, wounding and "de-housing" as 
many German city dwellers as possible, 
especially in industrial cities. Such a 
conjuncture was precisely the argument of 
The Valour and the Horror. Unlike the film, 
however, the authors of Volume 3 show that 
the decision to stress area bombing was a 
decision of higher command, including the 
British War Cabinet, and that it came about 
because of several factors. including long-
held theories about the potential impact of 
bombing upon enemy morale; the inability of 
the RAF to make precision attacks at night; 
the strongly-held desire of the British (and 
Canadians, if poll results presented in the 
book are a valid measure) to pay the Germans 
back for their own area bombing of London, 
Coventry and other centres; and the powerful 
necessity of making some important 
contribution to the war in the west while the 
forces of the Soviet Union were fighting and 
dying in large numbers in the east. In short, 
while the official history offers a complex-
and surely valid-explanation of the onset of 
area bombing, The Valour and the Horror did 
not, preferring to account for the strategy in 
its depiction of the devil-figure Arthur Harris. 
Yet there is a sense in which the two 
accounts of the bomber offensive coincide. 
Both Volume 3 of the official history and 
"Death by Moonlight" elaborate a common 
central point: that British and Canadian 
aircrew were deliberately sent out, night after 
night, to kill innocent Germans, with little 
benefit to the war effort. At its crudest, the 
argument of both is that the RAF and RCAF 
killed Germans just for the sake of killing 
Germans. The impact of this contention is 
perhaps stronger in Volume 3 of the official 
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history because it is, after all, an elaborately 
researched and documented official history. 
The melancholy conclusion its team of authors 
reach in assessing the bombing role is that 
"the Combined Bomber Offensive (by both the 
RAF /RCAF and the United States Army Air 
Force) against Germany did not begin to meet 
its objectives-the progressive, if not sudden, 
decline in enemy war production and, later, 
civilian morale-until the last months of 1944, 
four full years after it began in earnest." 
(pp.865-867) 
It should be noted that although the 
authors assert in the sentence quoted here 
that the strategic bombing offensive began in 
1940, it was 1942 that was the true beginning 
of the offensive, according to the authors 
themselves. It was this contention-the 
combination of frightfulness and pointless 
sacrifice-that attracted the media, and 
appeared to offer vindication for the position 
taken by the McKennas in The Valour and the 
Horror. 
We believe it is precisely here that Volume 
3 of the official history is most open to 
criticism. But before taking up that point we 
should state that this book has many real 
strengths. It is well written and almost 
invariably interesting. Divided into sections 
on Air Policy, The Fighter War, The Maritime 
Air War, The Bomber War, and Air Transport, 
it gives a remarkably complete overview of the 
massive and varied Canadian air effort in 
overseas theatres during the Second World 
War. The Bomber War section is especially 
valuable for the technical detail it supplies on 
bombing operations, aircraft and the course 
of actual missions. An outstanding merit of 
this section is the analysis of the war of 
electronic measures and counter-measures, 
a major feature of the night-bombing 
campaign. The description of this aspect of 
the bomber war is probably the best short 
account that has appeared in print. 
Yet there are problems with Volume 3 of 
the official history, particularly in its 
treatment of the strategic bombing offensive. 
The authors are almost obsessively concerned 
to establish that Harris' sole aim in the 
offensive was to destroy German cities and 
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kill German civilians. But this is contested 
by no credible historian; it has long been 
well-established that the German population 
and the morale of the German people were 
prime targets of Bomber Command. The real 
puzzle was why the air staff believed so firmly 
in the fragility of civilian morale, yet this 
question is never raised in Volume 3 of the 
official history. (The roots of this belief are to 
be found in the RAF staff in 1917-1918, and 
may in part be connected with an upper class 
perception of the emotional volatility of the 
industrial working classes-a mistaken 
assumption if there ever was one.) 
The assault on German civilians and their 
morale was by no means the only endeavour 
engaged in by Bomber Command, which in 
fact waged a multifaceted campaign against 
industrial targets, rail and communications 
systems, aircraft manufacturing plants and 
other war material industries, oil refineries, 
and so on. All this is carefully detailed in 
Volume 3 of the official history, at the same 
time as the authorial team condemns Harris 
for being so single-minded about area 
bombing. Sometimes Harris selected targets 
other than cities of his own volition; sometimes 
at the suggestion of his seniors, such as 
Portal and Eisenhower. This contradiction, 
which runs through the bombing section of 
Volume 3, suggests that the authors took 
literally Harris' bombastic rhetoric, as in his 
letter to the Undersecretary of State for Air of 
25 October 1943 in which he declared that 
the aim of RAF bombing was, quite simply, 
"the destruction of German cities, the killing 
of German workers and the disruption of 
civilised community life throughout 
Germany." (pp. 724-25) If Harris was so rigidly 
committed to these objectives, as the authors 
believe, then why the varied missions mounted 
by Bomber Command? 
The likely answer is that Harris shared 
the inconsistencies which overtake all of us, 
including senior commanders. He made 
compromises, he was susceptible to pressures 
from others, and occasionally he changed his 
mind or was ready to try new approaches. 
Moreover, Harris was not Bomber Command, 
only its Air Officer Commanding in Chief. 
Volume 3 of the official history reduces 
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Bomber Command to a one-man show. It is 
to be regretted that the kind of sophisticated 
analysis of the many factors making up 
American bombing policy (and its many 
contradictions) to be found in Conrad C. 
Crane's Bombs, Cities and Civilians: American 
Airpower Strategy in World War II (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1993) are missing 
in this volume. 
In another respect the approach taken by 
the authors of this volume of the official 
history intersects with that of the producers 
of The Valour and the Horror. Both conclude 
that the bomber offensive did not achieve the 
objectives of its proponents. In two or thre 
paragraphs tacked on to the end of the Bomber 
War section, a series of considerations are 
listed which attest to the importance of the 
bombing offensive, whether as establishing a 
"Second Front" when no other means was 
available to do so diverting substantial 
German manpower and war material to air 
defence at the cost of German armies in the 
field. But given the weight of the narrative, 
these paragraphs are perfunctory and appear 
almost as afterthoughts. 
What grounds do the authors have for 
their conclusions about the effectiveness of 
the Combined Bomber Offensive? There is no 
scholarly assessment of the United States 
share of that offensive, nor is there any 
discussion of the differing views that exist on 
the overall offensive. Nearly half a century 
after the compilation of the British and 
American strategic bombing surveys, the 
authors of Volume 3 accepted the view of 
some authorities on the meaning of that body 
of evidence-authorities well known for the 
opinion that the campaign was a failure-and 
ignore the evidence brought forward by other 
authorities of a different view. Neither 
Williamson Murray nor Richard Overy, for 
example, are cited, yet their research pointed 
to the conclusion that the RAF offensive had 
a significant impact on the course of the war. 
There is, in sum, a remarkable contrast 
between the quality of analysis made by the 
authors on bombing operations and German 
defensive measures, and the lack of analysis 
in assessing the value of the campaign of 
which these operations were a part. The jury 
is still out on the actual impact of the bombing 
offensive upon Germany and on the outcome 
of the war itself; it cannot be said that Volume 
3 of the official history has contributed much 
to the matter. 
It would be hard to say whether the stance 
taken by the authors on the bombing offensive 
derives in part from a moral revulsion against 
the form that offensive took. At one point 
(p.843) the authors refer to the "moral 
ambiguity" of area bombing against German 
cities, but nowhere in their section on the 
Bomber War is there either a moral or legal 
discussion of the issues raised by an air war 
levied against civilian populations. Scot 
Robertson, in his essay on the strategic 
bombing offensive elsewhere in this book, 
confronts these questions directly. Indeed, 
the authors of Volume 3 at the very least do 
not contend that German cities were "open" 
and "undefended"; their discussion of 
Luftwaffe defensive measures is admirably 
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thorough, and heavy Canadian aircrew losses 
are a testimony to the effectiveness of the 
German air defence system. 
In the concluding pages of the Bomber 
War section, the authors quote from an 
editorial of the Globe & Mail of 23 March 1945 
(p.864). The editorial, after asserting that the 
bomber offensive had crippled the German 
economy, contended that "the real victory of 
Allied air power" was "a thing of the mind-a 
lesson so terrible as never to be forgotten ... 
. The German people will not need the presence 
of Allied armies to persuade them that they 
lost this war. The storm which is sweeping 
them from the air. ... is convincing them that 
they have suffered the most terrible defeat 
ever inflicted on a people in all history." Out 
of this, the Globe hoped, would come a resolve 
by the people of Germany to live 
"constructively and compatibly alongside 
[their] neighbours." 
The comment by the authors of this official 
history is deeply revealing oftheir interpretive 
position. "If that were the case," they wrote, 
"then the long casualty lists the Globe had 
published over the last five years would have 
some meaning." The whole thrust of Volume 
3 of the official history is that the bomber 
offensive was a misguided failure, and that 
the deaths of 9,919 Canadians in Bomber 
Command were essentially meaningless in 
the total picture of the war. 
But surely the Globe editorial was 
fundamentally correct. No event other than 
the final surge of the Red Army into Berlin 
brought the war home more crushingly to the 
German people than the long-sustained 
bomber offensive with its terrible casualties 
and immense damage. They knew, and their 
postwar, post-Nazi leaders knew, that 
Germany could not suffer another war as 
terrible as the Second World War and the 
German state would have to take a new path. 
Out of this realization came the Schuman 
Plan of 1950, the European Economic 
Community of 1957 and the European 
Community of today. Out of it also came the 
emergence of a democratic and responsible 
Germany in full partnership and alliance 
with the states that once had bombed it. 
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